“Power does not corrupt men; fools, however, if they get into a position of power, corrupt power.”
-
George Bernard Shaw
History has consistently
demonstrated that oppression is rarely the act of a single despot. It is more
often the by-product of flawed systems that slowly erode public institutions
and sentiment. The world’s most brutal regimes did not emerge overnight; but
from a gradual collapse of governance and civic trust. Post-World War I
sanctions crippled Germany’s economy, sowing the seeds of resentment that gave
rise to Nazism. Adolf Hitler was a symptom, not the cause. The fall of the
Soviet Union followed decades of systemic exploitation of the peasantry. Even
the mighty Roman Empire collapsed under the weight of institutional decay,
veiled by entertainment and fake austerity.
In the same vein, the
Enforcement Directorate (ED) does not operate in isolation. It is the
product of a larger socio-political environment: one where citizens have
passively allowed the expansion of state power, often under the guise of good
governance. A bloated government structure has demanded more revenue,
leading to a taxation regime that views the public with inherent suspicion.
Trust between citizen and state has eroded. In this environment, insecurity and
inefficiency flourish, governance becomes reactive, and the seeds of corruption
are sown deep.
There are three reasons why the
ED has come to wield such power:
1. Incentivization Metrics
Like any bureaucracy, the ED
officers’ performance is evaluated through quantifiable metrics: number of
arrests, recoveries of assets, filing of prosecution complaints, and conviction
rates. This target-based model inevitably distorts investigative priorities.
Once a case is registered and an arrest has been made, there is institutional
pressure to justify the action – regardless of the strength of evidence. This
may take any fair, unfair, legal, or illegal means. Given the impetus on
revenue collections, the ED also has a mandate to recover
monies to fill in government coffers. With this, there is a
reputational target associated in terms of which officer makes how many
arrests. These are all natural phenomena of any target-based profession.
The trials in PMLA cases face
long pendency in courts. This structure offers no incentive to improve
the quality of investigations. Instead, it encourages procedural aggression to
meet administrative goals in terms of recoveries and arrests. Any organization
operating under such a system, where performance is based on action, not
outcomes, will behave similarly.
The ED also takes little
responsibility for the
speed of the trial repeating that it is only an investigating authority
and have no role once the trial commences. However, this argument is forgotten during
bail hearings. During such bail hearings, the ED
not only vehemently opposes bails, but also appeals
in higher forums where courts do grant bails.
2.
Commodification of Power
In India today, power is
increasingly transactional. Whether it’s a street-level
traffic cop or a member
of Parliament, positions of authority are attained not through merit,
but through money and influence. This commodification of power means that
public office is seen as an investment – one that must yield
returns. Naturally, the holders of such positions, both significant and
insignificant, must endeavour to extract value from them, fuelling a
self-reinforcing cycle of corruption.
This environment breeds
contempt for institutions themselves. Recent incidents underscore this erosion:
the outgoing
SEBI Chairperson was denied a proper farewell; the Supreme
Court has openly called for introspection as public faith in the judiciary
wanes; PMLA
cases have been likened to overly misused domestic violence charges.
When positions are bought, not earned, there is little incentive to uphold the
dignity they demand. Power is no longer a responsibility – it is an asset to be
exploited.
Even the machinery responsible
for appointments is affected. This is not an aberration or a one-off instance
anymore. It has become a feature of administration. When appointments to
positions of oversight are themselves up for sale, accountability vanishes. The
system becomes a network of quid pro quo – and the abuse of office becomes not
the exception, but the rule.
3.
Unchecked
Powers
The PMLA grants the ED sweeping
powers, particularly under Sections 24 and 50. These provisions invert
the principle of innocent
until proven guilty and enable arrests, attachment, recording of
statements, and raids with minimal judicial scrutiny. Even
the raids do not need any judicial warrant which goes against
the principles of life and liberty under Article 21 of the constitution. Statements
made before ED officials are admissible in court, unlike with the
police. Safeguards that apply to other investigating authorities are
conspicuously absent here.
This
legal architecture places enormous, unaccountable power in the hands of a large
and growing organization. Like any bureaucratic machine, the ED has its
share of under-motivated or under-skilled officers – but when everyone is
empowered to act without meaningful checks, accountability dilutes. It results
in a tragedy
of the commons: if one officer can meet their targets through
shortcuts, why should another work harder to build a robust case?
In fact, why shouldn’t the
officer, just once in a while, abuse that power for personal gains – money,
power, property, or even if just to meet a Bollywood celebrity. After all,
everyone else is doing it.
The demands of the job are heavy. The tools at hand are overwhelming. The incentives are skewed. In such an environment, abuse is not an anomaly – it is an inevitability.
The rise of the ED and the
gradual normalization of its excesses cannot be understood merely through the
lens of statutory interpretation or isolated misuse. It is a reflection of a
broader institutional decay – a public that has accepted overreach in the name
of order, a system where positions of power are bought and sold, and a legal
framework that rewards action over justice. If left unchecked, these forces
will not just undermine the rule of law – they will redefine it entirely. Power
without oversight does not drift toward justice – it hardens into habit. And
habits, once institutionalized, become law. True accountability begins not just
with reforming the ED, but with dismantling the culture that created and
emboldened it. It is not the ED that threatens the rule of law, but our silence
when we forget it.
