10 August, 2025

PMLA 6/8 - Architecture

‘How many men and women have you watched die?’

‘Lately, only those whom I could not save,’ said Snape.

-        Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows

The Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) was introduced with the stated intent of combating the menace of financial crime and protecting the financial integrity of India. Over the years, however, what was intended as a law of international harmony has morphed into a tool of systemic coercion. What makes this transformation especially troubling is not merely the text of the law, but the institutional ecosystem built to implement it – a web of entities that are supposed to check each other, but in practice, form a self-reinforcing loop of executive dominance and judicial abdication. Let’s unpack the institutions one by one.

 

1.      Enforcement Directorate

At the heart of the PMLA's machinery is the Enforcement Directorate (ED) – an agency that was once a specialized unit for probing foreign exchange violations and has now become arguably the most powerful wing of the executive.

In theory, the ED is merely an investigative agency. But in reality, it has been granted powers of arrest, seizure, raids, and the authority to record statements which are admissible as evidence – unlike those recorded by the police. The ED is not bound by the procedural constraints of the CrPC in many respects, nor is it subject to judicial checks in the way traditional law enforcement is.

The most common defence for these extraordinary powers is that ED's actions are subject to judicial oversight. But this is a flawed premise. The judiciary is not a substitute for legislature. The courts are there to adjudicate disputes, not to supervise agencies. When the ED acts as investigator, prosecutor, and de facto judge, and when its actions take years to be meaningfully reviewed by courts, the oversight is illusory at best and cosmetic at worst. 


2.      Public Prosecutor

In an ideal world, the Public Prosecutor (PP) serves as an officer of the court, tasked with presenting facts and assisting the court in arriving at a fair conclusion – not with “winning” cases. But under the PMLA framework, the PP is seen less as an impartial actor and more as a legal extension of the ED.

Instead of an officer ensuring justice, the PP often becomes an advocate for the ED’s narrative. This dynamic is reinforced by the performance incentives implicitly or explicitly tied to conviction rates and favourable outcomes. In such a framework, the PP’s allegiance tends to lie with the agency instructing it, not with the ideal of justice. As a result, the burden of restoring balance shifts heavily to the defence counsel.


3.      Defence Counsel

In the PMLA ecosystem, the defence counsel is not just a lawyer – they are often the only lifeline the accused has. They must navigate an aggressively stacked system, where the ED has vast powers, and where procedural rights like bail are harder to obtain than convictions.

A good defence counsel under PMLA must be a master of complex law, an administrator, a litigation strategist, and, increasingly, a crusader against procedural injustice. They must contend not just with hostile prosecutors, but with overburdened judges, missing case papers, delayed listings, and frequent non-appearances by the ED. In this context, the lawyer becomes not just legal counsel, but often the only functioning institution standing between the accused and institutional annihilation. The defence counsel must be a master of law as well as person of integrity. Sadly, in the increasingly corrupt structure, this is becoming a rare find.

 

4.      Special Court

The Special Court under PMLA, designated for trials and bail matters, is supposed to be the first line of judicial review – when it comes to arrests, bails, trials, and the hundred things in between. But in reality, it often functions as a reluctant gatekeeper. Burdened with other responsibilities and functioning in an atmosphere where granting bail under PMLA is considered taboo, these courts have developed a culture of deference – not to the Constitution, but to the ED. In one case, the special court has even remarked “ED matters mein kaunsi bail hoti hai.”

In cities like Patna, there has not been a single bail granted in PMLA matters during 2017-25, across 115 cases. Bail hearings are treated as formalities leading to inevitable rejection. Lawyers often joke grimly that the goal is to get rejected fast, so they can appeal to the High Court. This process itself takes months. In the meantime, the accused languishes in jail – unconvicted, unheard, unseen.

Lower courts have, in some instances, even been scolded by High Courts for acting as an extended arm of the ED rather than an independent judicial body. Yet, nothing changes. The fear of appearing “soft on crime” outweighs the duty to uphold fundamental rights.


 

5.      High Court

The High Court is where real bail relief is often granted, but getting there is not easy. It’s expensive. It's time-consuming. Arguments take time to be heard. And unlike lower courts where one can repeatedly mention a case for early hearing, High Courts are slow-moving giants. That coupled with the idea that bail still needs to pass through some of the most stringent bail provisions ever enacted in the history of independent India.

The High Court may offer some balance, but by the time it does, the damage is already done. Businesses are ruined. Properties are gone. Months – sometimes years – are lost. As a forum of appeal, the High Court offers correction, but not protection.

 

6.      Supreme Court

The Supreme Court is the ultimate interpreter of law and the final forum of appeal. It is also the only court empowered to examine the constitutionality of the PMLA itself. Over the years, it has made several significant pronouncements, including on the need for reasons to believe for arrest and attachment, and on the admissibility of statements recorded under Section 50.

Yet, these interventions have often resulted in symbolic victories with minimal real-world impact. “Reasons to believe” is now a cut-and-paste boilerplate paragraph in most ED documents. Judgments have not altered conduct. The Vijay Madanlal Choudhary case upheld most of the law’s controversial features, sparking widespread criticism among legal scholars.

Yes, the Supreme Court remains a ray of hope. But hope is not a system. It cannot compensate for institutional collapse at every lower level.

 

7.      Adjudicating Authority

The Adjudicating Authority (AA) under the PMLA is not a court, and not even composed of judges. It is usually headed by IRS officers – executive appointees – functioning under the administrative control of the same Ministry that runs the ED.

The ED prepares a “reason to believe” document, which is lifted almost verbatim into the AA’s Show Cause Notice. The AA then issues an order – often a copy-paste of the original submission, invoking the presumption of culpability under Section 24. There is no meaningful hearing. No reasoned application of mind. Just a bureaucratic loop dressed up as adjudication.

 

8.      Appellate Tribunal

The Appellate Tribunal under PMLA hears challenges to orders of the Adjudicating Authority. It is supposed to be a more judicial forum, but suffers from massive delays, frequent vacancies, and procedural inefficiencies.

The tribunal is not equipped with the infrastructure or independence necessary to handle sensitive and high-stakes cases involving the seizure of assets and livelihoods. Furthermore, it often ends up rubber-stamping the lower orders, relying heavily on the presumptions under Section 24, rather than conducting a de novo review of evidence.

 

What we have is not a few bad apples. What we have is an orchard designed to rot.

The PMLA institutional architecture – from ED to PP, from Adjudicating Authority to Appellate Tribunal – is a closed-loop system. It investigates, adjudicates, punishes, and delays – all within a framework where checks and balances are either symbolic or absent.

We must stop pretending that a flawed system can be justified by the promise of eventual appeals. A good law is not one that can be corrected by the Supreme Court. A good law is one that does not need correction at all.

If we want to protect the rule of law – if we want the fight against crime to be credible – we must fix the system that prosecutes it. Because when the law itself becomes a threat, the nation has already lost its first war.

03 August, 2025

PMLA 5/8 - Oversight

Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?

– Satire VI, 347-348

In any constitutional democracy, especially one as large and diverse as India, enforcement agencies that wield coercive powers must be subject to independent oversight – both parliamentary and administrative. Yet, in the case of the Pevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA), there is virtually no external check. In this chapter, we review the common checks and balances claimed for the PMLA, and the ways they are sidestepped.

 

1. “Any attachment under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) needs to be confirmed by the Adjudicating Authority (AA). The AA is a quasi-judicial forum and hence impartial by nature.”

Section 6 of the PMLA envisages that the AA shall consist of a Chairperson and two members – at least one of whom will have experience in the field of law. In reality, the Adjudicating Authority consists of a single-member bench who is an IRS – not from the field of law.

Most tribunals in the country operate under the Ministry of Law, to prevent any conflict of interest. For example, the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) comes under the Ministry of Law. However, the AA takes administrative support from the Ministry of Finance – the same as the ED. This is not just oversight – it’s institutional incest.

A Right to Information request revealed that only 2.1% of 1,518 Provisional Attachment Orders filed by the ED have been struck down by the AA. This is not “independent application of mind.” This is rubber-stamp adjudication. And the consequences are dire – properties are seized, bank accounts are frozen, businesses collapse – all before a court trial even begins.

The Supreme Court, in cases like Union of India v. R. Gandhi and Swiss Ribbons v. Union of India, has made it abundantly clear: adjudicatory bodies must not be under the administrative thumb of the ministries that appear before them.

The Supreme Court warned in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997), judicial independence is not just a matter of structure – it’s about function. Tribunals, especially those dealing with life-altering powers like asset seizure and forfeiture, must be both independent and perceived to be independent.

Telangana High Court observed in VANPIC Ports Pvt. Ltd. v. ED, the AA often issues mechanical, copy-pasted orders, lifting language directly from the ED’s “reasons to believe” and reproducing them word-for-word in its Show Cause Notice and attachment confirmation. In plain English: the ED writes the script, and the Adjudicating Authority reads it out loud.


Article 50 of the Constitution, part of the Directive Principles of State Policy, mandates that the judiciary be separated from the executive. Because justice demands independence. It demands that no one be a judge in their own cause — nemo judex in causa sua.

The Adjudicating Authority, as it currently exists, is not a safeguard. It’s a bureaucratic backroom posing as a courtroom.

 

2. “There’s an appellate. If someone is unhappy with the tribunal’s decision, they can always appeal to a higher forum. There’s the Appellate Tribunal after the AA, and the High Courts after that, and the Supreme Court after that.”

Judicial appeals are not a substitute for fairness. Appeals are expensive, time-consuming, and emotionally exhausting. The very fact that one has to appeal to get a fair hearing is the problem. If the lower-level adjudication is biased or compromised, the damage is already done – especially when businesses are shut down, assets are seized, and reputations are destroyed in the meantime. Oversight that arrives only after injustice is not oversight. It is eulogy.

The damage here isn't just legal. It's moral. When business owners and professionals see their properties taken, not after a fair trial, but through an administrative order issued by someone who isn’t even required to have legal training – faith in the system crumbles. We don't need more layers of appeal. We need first-instance fairness.

And perhaps most importantly, we need to remember that a truly democratic state doesn't just prosecute crime – it protects its citizens from abuse of power.

 

3. Press Releases by the ED

The illusion of judicial oversight is further shattered when one examines the ED’s conduct outside the courtroom. The ED routinely issues press releases naming accused persons and alleging money laundering even before filing prosecution complaints (chargesheets). Meaning – the ED makes a public declaration of guilt before an investigation. A declaration of arrest is also a declaration of success – before any trial has even begun.

This openly prejudices the courts, violates the principle of presumption of innocence (a bedrock of Article 21, Constitution of India), and constitutes potential criminal contempt under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

In Re: P.C. Sen (1969), the Supreme Court held that prejudicial media commentary can constitute contempt of court.

Yet, no restraint is visible when the ED publicly narrates cases like completed stories, pre-empting judicial findings. The watchdog has become the storyteller – and the verdict writer. ED trials often end only in increased TRPs, while the legal trial never begins.

 

4. Summons

Another method the ED uses to circumvent fairness is through abusive issuance of summons. Summons under Section 50 of PMLA (invoking powers of a civil court under the CPC) are issued without reasonable notice. In multiple cases, notices were served after the time of appearance had already lapsed. Summons are issued across city and state borders, violating Order V, Rule 19A of the CPC, which limits such practices to prevent harassment. The ED hence, routinely operates outside of its jurisdiction.

The result: the accused are forced into logistical impossibilities, made to travel across states at short notice, and labelled non-cooperative when they fail. "Due process," in this system, has been reduced to a theatrical formalism.

 

5. Vigilance

Unlike the CBI, which is at least notionally under the supervision of the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC), the ED enjoys a freedom from accountability that is unmatched. It functions under the Ministry of Finance, and yet none of its procedural norms, internal audits, or patterns of investigation are subject to regular legislative review. No parliamentary committee examines the ED’s performance, misuse of powers, pendency of cases, conviction rates, or complaints from citizens. It is a black box wrapped in impunity.

We now turn to the internal vigilance mechanism – a system so flawed that it would be ridiculous if it weren’t so dangerous. In most government departments, vigilance is overseen by a Chief Vigilance Officer (CVO) – typically operating independent of the agency, tasked with reviewing misconduct, procedural violations, and abuse of power. But in the ED, the CVO is the Director of Enforcement himself.

Let that sink in: the chief of the ED is also in charge of investigating complaints against the ED. In other words, the watchdog reports to itself.

This is not just an administrative quirk – it is a violation of every known principle of natural justice, constitutional governance, and basic common sense. It undermines the very idea of vigilance, which is built on independence, insulation, and the ability to scrutinize without fear or favor.

A system where the ED is both the actor and the auditor creates a total collapse of internal accountability. Complaints from citizens, lawyers, and even other departments about procedural abuse – such as misuse of arrest powers, failure to provide ECIRs, or arbitrary attachment of property – are either ignored or dismissed summarily. There is no credible investigation, no transparency, and certainly no action.

When the person being abused by the system asks for redress, the system responds with silence. Because the judiciary will take months. The tribunal is toothless. The High Court is slow. The CVO? He’s the one who signed the arrest warrant.

What we’re looking at here is not just a lack of vigilance – it’s a deliberate design to avoid it. A system where the ED is accountable to no one but itself, and where the government has no institutional interest in reform, because the ED serves political ends far more effectively than it serves public justice.

In any healthy democracy, a law with such extraordinary powers — powers to arrest, to seize, to interrogate — must be accompanied by extraordinary safeguards. But here, we have the opposite: extraordinary powers and no safeguards. The fox is guarding the henhouse and the farmer has stopped asking questions. This is not how oversight works. This is how unconstitutional fiefdoms are born.

 

Not a single detailed report on ED’s performance has ever been tabled before Parliament. No whitepaper. No independent audit. What PMLA offers today is not real judicial or parliamentary oversight. It is a self-reinforcing administrative machinery, disguised in the trappings of law. The ED investigates. The ED's colleague adjudicates. The ED narrates guilt to the media. And when challenged, the ED says: Appeal if you dare.

Until there is first-instance fairness, until investigative and adjudicatory functions are separated, and until the courts demand and enforce real accountability, the PMLA will not just punish the guilty – it will destroy faith in justice itself.

27 July, 2025

PMLA 4/8 - Capital

Zuerst kamen sie” - Martin Niemöller

Scene: A gleaming corporate office in Mumbai. Employees buzz around unsuspectingly until three stern Enforcement Directorate (ED) officers walk in, flanked by an administrative officer. At the top floor, inside a glass cabin, sits Rajat Malhotra, founder of a successful export firm, known equally for his sharp suits and sharper mind.

RAJAT MALHOTRA (smiling wryly as ED officials enter): Gentlemen, unless you’re here with a cheque, I assume this is not a courtesy call?

ED OFFICER 1 (producing a thick file): Mr. Malhotra, we’re exercising powers under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Your corporate headquarters and warehouse are now attached.

RAJAT (raising an eyebrow): Attached? What is this? On what basis?

ED OFFICER 2: “This” sir, is Proceeds of Crime. Linked to a money laundering offence.

RAJAT: Ah yes, I’ve heard about it. You have been investigating something. But that offence, alleged I may say, was committed by the previous owners. Me or my company had nothing to do with it. The offence, I believe, happened in 1984? PMLA was enacted in 2002. That’s like taking my car away because the person I bought a motorcycle from forgot to wear a helmet before helmets were invented..

ED OFFICER 1: Yes. But the courts have upheld that money laundering is a continuing offence. So if the tainted property still exists, or if we can trace its value anywhere, we can attach it today. Doesn’t matter when the predicate offence occurred or who owns the property now.

RAJAT (leaning forward): So you're enforcing today’s law on yesterday’s act and punishing tomorrow’s business?

ED OFFICER 3 (smiling): That’s one way to put it…

RAJAT: Even if you can’t find the specific assets from back then?

ED OFFICER 2: Yes! The PMLA allows us to attach equivalent value. So if the Rs. 10 crore you allegedly laundered is untraceable, but you now if own a warehouse or flat or factory or shop or bank account or shares worth Rs. 10 crores – we seize that instead.

RAJAT: Do I at least get to pick which Rs. 10 crore you take? Or is that too democratic? And I will remind you that this is investment money. White, taxed, declared. And this warehouse? It's operational. It's not some benami farm.

ED OFFICER 1: Doesn’t matter. The law doesn't discriminate between dormant and operational capital. We attach book value, not market value. Your books still show the warehouse at Rs. 10 crore.

RAJAT (eyes narrowing): It was bought a decade ago. It’s worth four times that today.

ED OFFICER 3: Well, congratulations on the appreciation. But we aren’t valuers. The law goes by what’s on record. Actually your accountant helped us there.

RAJAT: You know there’s an old saying, “It is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong.

ED OFFICER 2: We actually have a different approach – be legally precise, but economically blind

RAJAT (scoffing): Why not just take my office chairs too? Or staff uniforms?

ED OFFICER 1 (checking the list): Actually, office equipment is part of the inventory frozen. Also, please vacate all floors. We’re taking possession.

RAJAT (stunned): Possession? My employees are still in there! My operations team, my engineers! You plan to boot them out?

ED OFFICER 3: Yes. We're empowered to take control, including physical assets. Occupants will be given 24 hours to vacate.

RAJAT (furious): This is economic sabotage! You don’t just take possession; you bleed a business dry. Capital isn’t just cash and property – it’s the flow of capital that gives the economy its lifeblood. When you seize a company’s office, freeze its account, or take possession of its warehouse, you’re not just punishing a criminal. You’re choking an enterprise. The banks will lose their collateral. Employees will lose their jobs. Entire families will lose their source of income. Customers lose trust. And the economy loses momentum. You pause operations, you kill everything.

ED OFFICER 2 (dryly): The economy is... an unfortunate externality in this process.

RAJAT: And what happens to my bank loan against this warehouse? It’s mortgaged!

ED OFFICER 1 (flipping a page): Yes, like that Rajokri farmhouse — Rs. 120 crore asset, mortgaged to a bank. We attached that too and converted it into our “office”. The borrower lost it. The bank lost its security. Fair’s fair.

RAJAT (jaw clenched): So you evict me, confiscate a live operation, and kill my employees' livelihoods. All this before trial? Before a single witness has testified? You know there’s something called Article 19(1)(g) of the constitution, which guarantees the right to practice any trade or profession.

ED OFFICER 3: Yes. But under the amended law, we can even sell your property before conviction. It’s called non-conviction based confiscation, or NCBC.

RAJAT: Sounds like a medical condition

ED OFFICER 2: Yes. Symptoms may include loss of assets, dignity, and sanity.

RAJAT: And if I’m acquitted?

ED OFFICER 2 (shrugging): There’s no provision for that. No restoration, no compensation. Not even an apology! The law’s silent.

RAJAT: Brilliant. So what exactly are you going to do with my warehouse? Start packing ED-branded fidget spinners?

ED OFFICER 1 (deadpan): It could be repurposed. For documentation, maybe storage. We do have a lot of documentation and constantly need administrative space. National interest you see.

RAJAT (sarcastic): Of course. National interest. And in the meantime, my factory stalls, orders lapse, vendors drop off, staff scattered; and you’ll say the law is doing its job.

ED OFFICER 3: We’re fighting crime. Not managing your balance sheet, Mr. Malhotra.

RAJAT: What is the logic of possession here? Had it been shares instead of property, will you vote in the AGMs? Do you take rent from seized flats? Do you become landlords? There are no timelines in this process. No trials. No outcomes.

ED OFFICER 2: That’s the beauty of it! The process itself is the punishment. We don’t need to wait for trial to conclude.

RAJAT: And when you call me for deposition, you’re asking for my entire family’s financial records. My wife’s jewellery? Mother’s pension receipts? Even my son’s tutoring bills?

ED OFFICER 2: If he’s connected to your finances, yes. Under PMLA, we can ask for detailed disclosures – not just from you, but from all linked individuals.

RAJAT (bitter now): You realize what all this does to investor sentiment, right? Foreign capital doesn’t like uncertainty. What message do we send when a legally acquired asset can be seized because someone else, somewhere in the chain of ownership, might have committed a crime decades ago? They’ll stop investing in the country.

ED OFFICER 1: We’re FATF compliant. Foreign investors will adjust. Everyone has faith in the legal system.

RAJAT: You think capital adjusts? No. Capital escapes.

(Pauses. He looks around the office one last time. The lights still buzz. His employees, unaware, continue working on their screens.)

RAJAT (grimly): This isn’t economic enforcement. It’s economic execution.

ED OFFICER 3 (quietly): We are neither economists nor harbingers of justice, Mr. Malhotra. We are enforcers.

[Fade out to the ED seal being fixed on the main gate. A business choked. A room emptied. Years go by. No trial, no verdict, just silence where capital once flowed.]

20 July, 2025

PMLA 3/8 - History

“Every lie we tell incurs a debt to the truth. Sooner or later, that debt is paid.”

- Valery Legasov, Chernobyl (2019)

PMLA continues to evolve as one of India’s most controversial laws. When accused of being draconian in its drafting and implementation, successive governments have deflected blame, claiming the law was crafted by the other guys. In truth, both major national parties have played significant roles in its enactment, amendment, and weaponization. While the law existed in relative obscurity for over a decade, its traction as a tool of state power surged after the 2018 amendments.

This chapter takes a deep dive into the inception, evolution, and, at times, the institutional misrepresentations and legal distortions that have shaped the rise of PMLA, revealing how a law meant to curb financial crime became a symbol of overreach. 


1988 – Vienna Convention

  • The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances
  • First major international treaty that called on member countries to criminalize money laundering
  • Drug trafficking and human trafficking are the major contributors to terror financing
  • In the future, terror financing may take on new forms (turned out to be true as in the modern era the major sources of terror financing are cyber-crimes, data piracy, and spyware)

Conclusion: The evil was money laundering itself – not any specific crime

 

1989 – FATF

  • Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established by the G7 nations
  • Aim: To develop and promote policies to combat money laundering and terror financing
  • 1990: The FATF issued 40 Recommendations, which became the global benchmark for anti-money laundering (AML) efforts
  • FATF Blacklist: List of jurisdictions that the FATF deems uncooperative
  • Blacklisting has often led to sanctions from developed economies and deters foreign investment

Effect on India

  • India is not a member of the G7 and did not become a member to the FATF till 2010
  • However, India faced various international pressures under the Vienna Convention, FATF, and the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
  • This resulted in the Prevention of Money Laundering Bill in 1998.

 

1998 – The Prevention of Money Laundering Bill

The 40 Recommendations of FATF required two core legal actions:

  • Criminalization of the act of money laundering
  • Power to the state to attach and confiscate properties earned out of proceeds of crime

However, the Indian Money Laundering Bill included conditions such as:

  • Presumption of guilt (guilty until proven innocent)
  • Twin bail conditions (proof of innocence before the trial)

Draconian Legislature

  • The conditions of presumption of guilt and twin bail conditions were not the requirements of the FATF
  • No G7 country provides for twin bail conditions or presumption of guilt in their AML statutes
  • These provisions were British-era legal devices to suppress dissent in colonies like India: not to combat financial crime
  • They stood in stark contrast to post-independence constitutional values and are not a part of any developed country
  • These conditions indicate a failure to decolonize India’s legal psyche, prioritizing state control over individual rights

 

1999-01 – Standing Committee Report

The Prevention of Money Laundering Bill was referred to the Standing Committee on Finance chaired by Shri Shivraj Patil. The Committee raised sharp criticisms, reflecting concerns about the Bill’s overreach and potential for abuse:

  • The reverse burden of proof violated the principle of innocence until proven guilty
  • The ED’s authority to arrest without warrants, attach property provisionally and indefinitely, conduct raids, and record admissible statements was seen as overly broad, lacking judicial oversight, and risking misuse
  • The definition of “proceeds of crime” and “money laundering” was ambiguous
  • Too many minor offences were included in the list of scheduled offences like falsification of accounts and imitation of firearms
  • Lack of clarity on procedural protections

Effect

  • The Committee’s recommendations were largely ignored
  • Rather than heeding the warnings, successive governments treated the Committee’s critique as a rulebook for implementation
  • Contentious provisions were not only retained but also later amplified

 

2002-05 – Enactment

  • The Bill was reintroduced in the Parliament in 2002 and received Presidential assent in 2003
  • The Bill was notified with rules only in 2005
  • During this time both the NDA and UPA governments stayed under constant FATF pressure to enact the AML laws.

 

2005-12 – Amendments

Several amendments were introduced during 2005-12, most notably:

  • Definition of money laundering was expanded
  • Introduction of concept of attachment of equivalent value of property
  • Chargesheet was no longer required for raids
  • The schedule of offences was expanded with each amendment

Analysis

  • PMLA included harsh provisions because it was envisioned as a law to combat international drug trafficking and human trafficking to stop terrorist funding
  • Harsh provisions were justified by calling money laundering as a heinous crime
  • While the schedule of offences was expanded, there was no dilution in the penal provisions
  • Now PMLA could be invoked even for petty crimes (eg. copyright violation) or crimes having nothing to do with money (eg.  murder)

 

2017 – Nikesh Tarachand Shah

In Nikesh Tarachand Shah vs. Union of India, a two-judge Supreme Court Bench, led by Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, struck down the twin conditions for bail as unconstitutional, citing the following reasons:

  • Requiring proof of innocence in the predicate offence was arbitrary, as PMLA focuses on money laundering, and not the predicate offence.
  • The twin conditions inverted the fundamental principle of innocence until proven guilty, clashing with Article 21 of the constitution
  • The penalties applied uniformly to all offenses, regardless of their severity, hence being disproportionate
  • Making bail nearly impossible, the accused was punished by the procedure rather than the conviction

Effect: The ruling was a landmark victory for liberty, emphasizing that economic offenses, while serious, cannot override constitutional protections.


2018 – Finance Act (Bill?)

  • In 2017 and 2018, the Finance Act was passed as a Money Bill, i.e. without the assent of the Rajya Sabha
  • The PMLA was amended via this Finance Act (Bill?) and the twin conditions for bail were restored with minor changes
  • The presumption of guilt and stringent bail criteria remained, failing to fully resolve the constitutional concerns of the Supreme Court.
  • PMLA saw a sudden increase in activity post enactment of the 2018 Finance Act (Bill?)

This move drew widespread criticism:

  • The government made an intentional evasion by bypassing the Rajya Sabha where the government lacked a majority
  • The amendment merely sidestepped judicial concerns rather than addressing them

Challenge

  • This move by the government has been challenged before the Supreme Court in Roger Mathews vs. Union of India
  • The Supreme Court has criticized the government for passing the Finance Act as a Money Bill in an interim order
  • However, the Supreme Court is yet to rule on the changes already enacted by the Finance Act (Bill?). The matter has been pending for 7 years.

 

2019 Amendments

  • Money laundering was now a continuing offence, i.e. even if the scheduled offence had occurred in 1947, the ED could attach properties and prosecute persons under the Act passed in 2002.
  • Explanation added to the definition of Money Laundering: “and” was effectively changed to “or”. Now any of the activities in the sequence of money laundering such as concealment, possession, acquisition or use, and projecting or claiming are money laundering offences independently.
  • Non-Conviction Based Confiscation: The Government now has the right to confiscate the attached properties before the trial was concluded, i.e. before any conclusion of conviction or acquittal was reached.
  • Once again, the law was made more stringent without dilution of the penal provisions

 

2022 – Vijay Madanlal Choudhary

The Supreme Court upheld the PMLA regime including the twin conditions, reverse burden, ECIR secrecy, and property attachment. The reasons given by the Supreme Court are as such:

  • The Parliament, as the people’s representative, had the wisdom and authority to enact stringent laws like PMLA to combat money laundering, a global scourge.
  • India’s international obligations under FATF

Analysis

  • The Court’s deference to parliamentary wisdom raises a troubling precedent: if legislative intent is sacrosanct, no law – however draconian – can be challenged
  • This undermined the Supreme Court’s role as a guardian of the constitution
  • The 2018 amendments, passed via a disputed Money Bill, question whether they truly reflect Parliament’s will, as the Rajya Sabha’s input was curtailed.

 

Future – Roger Mathews vs. Union of India

  • This case challenges the passing of the Finance Act 2017 and 2018 as Money Bills
  • The 5-judge bench has declared that certain provisions regarding tribunal appointments were unconstitutional
  • The core issue was referred to a larger 7-judge bench, which is still pending

 

Conclusion

  • The PMLA was introduced under global pressures, but was enacted by both major national parties
  • The FATF has often been blamed for the draconian provisions of PMLA, but those provisions are inherently Indian in nature
  • Judicial intervention was overruled by unconstitutional, unparliamentary, and undemocratic amendments
  • The Supreme Court failed to uphold its role as a guardian of the constitution

What began as an international obligation to combat drug trafficking has, in India, evolved into a powerful domestic statute marked by opacity, overreach, and constitutional strain. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act has not merely expanded in scope – it has shed the checks and balances that typically anchor criminal law in democratic societies.

From the early warnings of the Standing Committee to the surgical critiques of Justice Nariman, every opportunity to refine the Act has been met with procedural shortcuts or legislative indifference. And while the Supreme Court has now upheld the law’s architecture, key questions remain unresolved – including the manner in which the law was amended, the bypassing of Parliament’s upper house, and the fundamental inversion of due process. The history of PMLA, then, is not only a story of legislative evolution, but also one of democratic evasion. And that history is still being written.

13 July, 2025

PMLA 2/8 - Justification

“Power does not corrupt men; fools, however, if they get into a position of power, corrupt power.”

-        George Bernard Shaw

History has consistently demonstrated that oppression is rarely the act of a single despot. It is more often the by-product of flawed systems that slowly erode public institutions and sentiment. The world’s most brutal regimes did not emerge overnight; but from a gradual collapse of governance and civic trust. Post-World War I sanctions crippled Germany’s economy, sowing the seeds of resentment that gave rise to Nazism. Adolf Hitler was a symptom, not the cause. The fall of the Soviet Union followed decades of systemic exploitation of the peasantry. Even the mighty Roman Empire collapsed under the weight of institutional decay, veiled by entertainment and fake austerity.

In the same vein, the Enforcement Directorate (ED) does not operate in isolation. It is the product of a larger socio-political environment: one where citizens have passively allowed the expansion of state power, often under the guise of good governance. A bloated government structure has demanded more revenue, leading to a taxation regime that views the public with inherent suspicion. Trust between citizen and state has eroded. In this environment, insecurity and inefficiency flourish, governance becomes reactive, and the seeds of corruption are sown deep.

There are three reasons why the ED has come to wield such power:

 

1.      Incentivization Metrics

Like any bureaucracy, the ED officers’ performance is evaluated through quantifiable metrics: number of arrests, recoveries of assets, filing of prosecution complaints, and conviction rates. This target-based model inevitably distorts investigative priorities. Once a case is registered and an arrest has been made, there is institutional pressure to justify the action – regardless of the strength of evidence. This may take any fair, unfair, legal, or illegal means. Given the impetus on revenue collections, the ED also has a mandate to recover monies to fill in government coffers. With this, there is a reputational target associated in terms of which officer makes how many arrests. These are all natural phenomena of any target-based profession.

The trials in PMLA cases face long pendency in courts. This structure offers no incentive to improve the quality of investigations. Instead, it encourages procedural aggression to meet administrative goals in terms of recoveries and arrests. Any organization operating under such a system, where performance is based on action, not outcomes, will behave similarly.

The ED also takes little responsibility for the speed of the trial repeating that it is only an investigating authority and have no role once the trial commences. However, this argument is forgotten during bail hearings. During such bail hearings, the ED not only vehemently opposes bails, but also appeals in higher forums where courts do grant bails.

 

2.      Commodification of Power

In India today, power is increasingly transactional. Whether it’s a street-level traffic cop or a member of Parliament, positions of authority are attained not through merit, but through money and influence. This commodification of power means that public office is seen as an investment – one that must yield returns. Naturally, the holders of such positions, both significant and insignificant, must endeavour to extract value from them, fuelling a self-reinforcing cycle of corruption.

This environment breeds contempt for institutions themselves. Recent incidents underscore this erosion: the outgoing SEBI Chairperson was denied a proper farewell; the Supreme Court has openly called for introspection as public faith in the judiciary wanes; PMLA cases have been likened to overly misused domestic violence charges. When positions are bought, not earned, there is little incentive to uphold the dignity they demand. Power is no longer a responsibility – it is an asset to be exploited.

Even the machinery responsible for appointments is affected. This is not an aberration or a one-off instance anymore. It has become a feature of administration. When appointments to positions of oversight are themselves up for sale, accountability vanishes. The system becomes a network of quid pro quo – and the abuse of office becomes not the exception, but the rule.

 

3.      Unchecked Powers

The PMLA grants the ED sweeping powers, particularly under Sections 24 and 50. These provisions invert the principle of innocent until proven guilty and enable arrests, attachment, recording of statements, and raids with minimal judicial scrutiny. Even the raids do not need any judicial warrant which goes against the principles of life and liberty under Article 21 of the constitution. Statements made before ED officials are admissible in court, unlike with the police. Safeguards that apply to other investigating authorities are conspicuously absent here.

This legal architecture places enormous, unaccountable power in the hands of a large and growing organization. Like any bureaucratic machine, the ED has its share of under-motivated or under-skilled officers – but when everyone is empowered to act without meaningful checks, accountability dilutes. It results in a tragedy of the commons: if one officer can meet their targets through shortcuts, why should another work harder to build a robust case?

In fact, why shouldn’t the officer, just once in a while, abuse that power for personal gains – money, power, property, or even if just to meet a Bollywood celebrity. After all, everyone else is doing it.

The demands of the job are heavy. The tools at hand are overwhelming. The incentives are skewed. In such an environment, abuse is not an anomaly – it is an inevitability.

 

The rise of the ED and the gradual normalization of its excesses cannot be understood merely through the lens of statutory interpretation or isolated misuse. It is a reflection of a broader institutional decay – a public that has accepted overreach in the name of order, a system where positions of power are bought and sold, and a legal framework that rewards action over justice. If left unchecked, these forces will not just undermine the rule of law – they will redefine it entirely. Power without oversight does not drift toward justice – it hardens into habit. And habits, once institutionalized, become law. True accountability begins not just with reforming the ED, but with dismantling the culture that created and emboldened it. It is not the ED that threatens the rule of law, but our silence when we forget it.