Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Economics. Show all posts

15 May, 2026

RBI CIC Regulations

“Brutus is an honorable man.” – Mark Antony, Julius Ceaser Act III Scene II, William Shakespeare

In January 2015, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) made it mandatory for all Credit Institutions (CIs) of India to become members of all Credit Information Companies (CICs).

A Credit Institution is any entity in the business of lending money to customers. This ranges from large banks like HDFC Bank to village-level formal peer-lending systems. This article focuses on Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs), particularly, small NBFCs.

An NBFC is any company that is engaged in the business of lending money, acquisition of securities, hire-purchase insurance business, or chit-fund business which, as the name suggests, does not have a banking license. Hence, an NBFC cannot borrow from the RBI at low rates of interest. Most NBFCs are not allowed to accept public deposits either. This leads to scaling issues and hence NBFCs do not grow as big as banks. Of course, being an NBFC is the route of becoming a bank for most companies. This also means a less-strict regulatory regime on NBFCs compared to banks. As of April 2026, there were 9075 NBFCs in India. Due to their higher cost structure, NBFCs operate in a riskier segment of the market – small businessmen, household women, gold loans, small corporates, farmers etc.

A CIC is a company registered with the RBI that is in the business of collecting and disseminating credit information. There are four CICs in India. The most famous CIC is TransUnion CIBIL having a 70% market share in the Indian market. Others are Experian India (16%), CRIF High Mark (10%), and Equifax India (4%). Together with the RBI, the four CICs create the credit information infrastructure for India.

It is logical that lenders regulated under the RBI should report their lending activities on a periodic basis, so that other lenders interacting with a potential borrowers have knowledge of the credit behaviour of the customer. Put simply, whenever a customer walks into a bank for availing a loan, the first thing the bank does is check the CIBIL score of the customer. This is the first step in any lending process. And to increase transparency among lenders, the RBI in January 2015 mandated that all lenders make mandatory reporting to all four CICs in the country.

Which is where the problem begins.

1.      Why not a central repository?

This is the simplest, most obvious, and overlooked solution to the problem. Instead of 9k NBFCs reporting their credit information to all 4 CICs, they could simply report it to one. And the 4 CICs could work with the RBI to create a central repository of such credit data. This would release some unnecessary compliance burden and the corporate could focus on being a corporate.

This has been suggested to the RBI several times who have taken the idea in consideration and rejected it for reasons unknown.

2.      Unequal relationship with NBFCs

By mandating that every NBFC in the country be registered with every CIC, this gave CICs a semi-regulatory power. Now any CIC could threaten any NBFC with mandatory registration. A registration is a contract where terms must be met by both parties. But the terms of registration with a CIC are set by the CIC with NBFCs having no say. This creates an unequal relationship between two private entities mandated by state decree.

For example, the NBFC must set one nodal officer for all communications with the CIC. However, the CIC is allowed to create bureaucratic red tapes for the NBFC to struggle through various functional teams of the CIC. Any lapse that occurs out of this system can be easily blamed on the NBFC while the CIC was just following procedures.

3.      Private for-profit nature of CICs

Contrary to popular belief, CICs are not government bodies. In fact, they aren’t even Indian. 92% of CIBIL is owned by TransUnion, an American multinational group with headquarters in Chicago. Experian India is owned by Experian plc, Ireland; CRIF High Mark is owned by CRIF S.p.A., Italy; and Equifax India is owned by Equifax Inc, USA.

As per RBI mandates, every credit transaction in the country needs to be reported to all four of these CICs. So the next time you apply to a bank for a loan and they check your credit history on CIBIL, do not be surprised if you start getting calls from all kinds of spam callers offering you loans. Your private data is being sold on a real-time basis, not by Indian banks, but by entities far outside the control of the Indian regulatory regime. As per the RBI, this is a necessary cost to promote credit transparency in the country.

4.      Regulatory Powers to CICs

Under the CIC Regulations, 2006, CICs can report members who do not submit the credit information on time. With the January 2015 circular, CICs can now mandate every NBFC in the country to mandatorily report their credit information. This effectively makes NBFCs a hostage to the CICs. Given that CICs are private entities, their concern is not the well-being of the NBFCs, but the pursuit of profits. CICs have cumbersome systems which cannot be navigated by small companies who lack a dedicated reporting department. This allows CICs to sell software and compliance services through third-party agencies to ease the compliance burden on the NBFCs. The classic case of making money by solving a problem that didn’t exist in the first place. All under the garb of RBI regulations. Contrary to Uncle Ben’s wisdom, RBI’s decree of compulsory registration has given CICs inordinate power, but very little responsibility.

5.      Double profiteering

It is the duty of a CIC to collect and disseminate information. It collects information from its members, and it disseminates information to anyone who is willing to pay for such information. The RBI has made it mandatory for banks to check for CIC scores of potential borrowers before proceeding with any credit transaction. The RBI has also made it mandatory for all credit institutions to submit such credit information to the CICs. CICs charge money at both ends of the information stream, for receiving as well as disseminating information. If it is the duty of the CIC to collect information, then why are NBFCs paying money to the CICs to submit information?

This goes back to the unequal relationship where NBFCs must adhere to the terms specified by the CICs to be registered where the CIC mandates NBFCs to pay up to be registered.

6.      Use of Spam Bots

If you’ve ever had the (mis?)fortune of interacting with CIBIL, you would know that they do not use normal Indian numbers. The call would typically come from a foreign number and would be marked spam by whatever CallerID service you use.

If you do pick up the call, you will be told that CIBIL is recording the call. But if you were to ask for that recording in case of a dispute, then CIBIL would somehow lose that recording.

If you do manage to make it through a call, you would realize its always to sell something. Either it is your own credit score, or a credit score management software, or some third-party who got your number from CIBIL and want to sell you services that will improve your credit score. Ultimately, the data and attention of Indians is for grabs to the highest bidder.

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To conclude, the RBI is overlooking a very pertinent problem having an obvious solution. One can only assume incompetence or corruption to allow such issues to persist. The RBI has already mandated data preservation laws for credit card transactions and central repository laws for large borrowers. The same can be implemented for CICs. It is also strange that such a critical infrastructure which forms a cornerstone of modern Indian banking is left to the regulation of four foreign entities who have been given quasi-regulatory powers by the RBI.

02 April, 2026

PMLA – Delhi Liquor Policy Case 3

The article follows the events described in the author’s previous works being (1) Enforcement Directorate vs. Arvind Kejriwal and (2) PMLA - Delhi Liquor Policy Case. The current article stems from subsequent developments and may be read as an independent piece.

 

BACKGROUND

On 30-Mar-2026, the ED moved to the Delhi High Court challenging the 22-Jan-2026 order of the Rouse Avenue District Court (Trial Court).

As per the original order, the ED had made the allegation that Arvind Kejriwal had deliberately skipped the summons sent by the ED in respect of the investigation in the Delhi Liquor Policy Case. The case had lasted for 22 months 16 days before the trial court finally acquitting Arvind Kejriwal vide a 51-page order. It may be noted that this case was not the trial of the actual money laundering offence, but only restricted to the point of skipping the summons of the ED.

During these 22 months 16 days, Arvind Kejriwal had been arrested, interrogated, arrested again, bailed, interrogated again, bailed again, and discharged in the Delhi Liquor Policy Scam Case.

Now the ED, in its wisdom, has challenged the acquittal of Kejriwal with respect to a summons he did not attend, in a case where the custodial interrogation is over, investigation is already complete, the accused has served jail-time, and has been discharged, with scathing remarks on the conduct of the ED. The remarks of the Trial Court have since been stayed by the Delhi High Court. The ED still believes that it was wrong of the Trial Court to acquit Arvind Kejriwal for not attending the summons.

 

RATIONALE

The purpose of a summons is to question a witness or an accused. The ED has already availed the opportunity of interrogating Kejriwal in custody after arresting him in March 2024. One of the grounds of arrest was also the skipping of the said summons. However, the ED still wants its pound of flesh against Kejriwal for skipping the summons.

But that is not the entire concern here. The non-attendance of a summons is an offence under section 174 of the erstwhile IPC [section 208 of the BNS]. The punishment for such non-attendance is a maximum of one month of imprisonment, or fine of Rs. 500, or both. By any reasonable stretch of imagination, Arvind Kejriwal has already served such punishment. However, the sheer expense of the appearance of senior counsels before the High Court now shall be borne by the taxpayers of India. For a case which shall serve no purpose even if the ED were to somehow win in its obstinate grudge against Arvind Kejriwal.

The natural question arises, why are the taxpayers of the country paying for the punishment for non-attendance in a summons of a person who has already been arrested, remanded, interrogated, and discharged from the case?

The only reasonable explanation in this unreasonable charade is that there were certain legal lacunae in the order of the Trial Court which may be used by future litigants, and hence need to be dispelled before a higher forum. But this argument does not stand on its own legs. Trial Courts are not constitutional courts and their judgements are not quotable. Any court can disagree with the rationale taken by a trial court.

We fail to find any reasonable logic behind the challenge of the acquittal in summons, while the punishment is already infructuous. But as it often happens, when reasonable logics leave the floor, we can think of unreasonable probabilities that might be the reason. Perhaps the ED is only looking to make a media show of Arvind Kejriwal; perhaps the senior counsel simply desires a new car; or perhaps the ED already knows that the discharge of Arvind Kejriwal shall soon be overturned by the High Court. Arvind Kejriwal has already moved to the Supreme Court for a change in the bench at the Delhi High Court, citing reasons of biasness.

The author is not a fan of Arvind Kejriwal. The author is a fan of Jack Daniels whiskey which was not available in Delhi due to the Delhi Liquor Policy under Arvind Kejriwal. So we bear no sympathy towards the then Chief Minister. But after having gone through what Kejriwal has endured, if he thinks that the ED is banking on the bias of the judges in the High Court, we can hardly blame the man.

02 March, 2026

PMLA - Delhi Liquor Policy Case


The timeline of the Delhi Liquor Policy Scam Case looks like a game of snakes and ladders. For the purposes of this article, we have refrained from going into the merits of the case and the 598-page judgement of the Delhi trial court in the matter. We simply take a look at the timeline which offers some interesting revelations.
  • During August-November 2022, the CBI and the ED registered the corruption and money-laundering cases almost simultaneously. The ED then quickly files a chargesheet where Arvind Kejriwal is not named as an accused.

  • In March 2024, the ED arrested Arvind Kejriwal. For the first time in independent India, a sitting Chief Minister of a state was arrested. The Lok Sabha elections were scheduled after two months.

  • By May 2024, the ED had already filed multiple chargesheets in the case. Only in the 7th chargesheet it named Arvind Kejriwal as an accused, after his arrest. This happened just before the elections 2024 Lok Sabha elections.

  • In June 2024, Kejriwal was granted bail by the Delhi trial court. The next day, the bail was stayed by the Delhi High Court upon oral mentioning by the ED. Subsequently, the bail was cancelled by the High Court.

  • After rejection from the High Court, Kejriwal appealed for bail in the Supreme Court. Meanwhile, the CBI emerged. Kejriwal was arrested by the CBI while already in custody in the ED case. Kejriwal secured bail in the ED case but had to continue incarceration because of being arrested by the CBI as well now.

  • In July 2024, The Delhi High Court reserved its order in the bail matter in the CBI case. The same day, the CBI filed its 5th and final chargesheet in the case where Kejriwal was named as an accused for the first time. Then the High Court's order came where Kejriwal's bail was rejected.

  • Finally, Kejriwal secured bail in September 2024 from the Supreme Court and discharge in the entire case in February 2026.

  • This is the second time in three months when a high-profile political ED case has fallen flat because the predicate offence has been invalidated - the previous one being National Herald in December 2025.

  • The government had already challenged the closure of a ED case upon closure of the predicate offence in the National Herald case. This goes against the principles established in various Supreme Court judgements including Vijay Madanlal Choudhury. But the matter remains sub-judice for now.

  • Meanwhile, the government had proposed the 130th Constitutional Amendment Bill in August 2025. It may be time to review that.

12 January, 2026

PMLA – ED vs. Didi

On 8th January, 2026, the city of Kolkata saw an interesting altercation between the Enforcement Directorate (ED) and the West Bengal Chief Minister, Smt. Mamata Banerjee. This article does not claim to be an exhaustive or even an accurate description of the events that have transpired since. There is much to be revealed (or forgotten, depending on the media narrative) in the days to come. However, this article aims to answer (or just raise) 6 questions that remain unanswered as on the night on 11th January, 2026.

1.      Does the ED need to inform the local police of a raid prior to commencing the raid?

As per multiple media reports, the raid at Pratik Jain’s residence started at around 6 AM at Loudon Street. A police sergeant arrived at Jain’s residence at around 9 AM, but was denied entry. It is also reported that even a DCP was denied entry. However, it is not reported why the sergeant sought entry in the first place, or why the DCP did not immediately react.

After trying for 2 hours, the Kolkata police filed a complaint at 11:20 AM. Shortly afterwards at 11:30 AM, the ED informed Kolkata police about its presence at Jain’s residence. Interestingly, this information has vanished from the internet. Readers may still find it on Times of India, Kolkata edition, dt. 10.01.2026, Page 3, or other similar print editions. Also, ChatGPT remembers.

Strictly and legally, there is no statutory requirement of any central agency (ED / IT / CBI / NIA) to inform the local police before conducting a search / raid. That said, it is customary for a central agency to inform the local police for coordination or security. When this does not happen, it may raise to disputes regarding the identity of the ED officers, or create logistical hurdles, or simply lead to a confrontation between the two authorities, as it happened in the present case.

This is not the first time the ED has conducting raids without informing the local police. The agency found itself amid a similar controversy in 2022 when the then Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh and member of the Indian National Congress (INC / Congress), Bhupesh Baghel, objected to the ED’s raids occurring without informing the local police. In 2025, Baghel was raided and his son was arrested by the ED.

2.      Can the persons who are being raided leave the premises?

It is common practice for a raiding agency to restrict the movement of persons while conducting a raid. This is to prevent removal or destruction of evidence. However, the agency is not allowed to restrict the movement of persons or even their departure from the premises as that would amount to illegal detention or arrest. A raid is conducted on a premises, and persons may be allowed to enter or exit upon inspection.

In the present case, a controversy emerged when police personnel were not allowed to enter the premises during the raid and when the West Bengal Chief Minister entered the premises and exited with documents and digital devices. The ED has already filed a case before the Calcutta High Court that this act of the Chief Minister amounts to obstruction of an official investigation. However, the exact allegations and the defence are not known yet.

3.      Can the ED file a Writ Petition?

As of 11th January, 2026, the ED has filed 2 writ petitions – (1) on 9th January, before the Calcutta High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution against the State of West Bengal, the Chief Minister, senior Kolkata Police officials, and the CBI, and (2) on 10th January, before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution against the State of West Bengal, the Chief Minister, and senior Kolkata Police officials.

The Article 226 petition alleges an obstruction in an official investigation, removal of evidence, and seeks a CBI enquiry into the events that transpired during the raid. An Article 226 application is often made against a state actor / government machinery, in this case the state of West Bengal. The matter could not be heard amidst a chaotic courtroom on 9th January and has been rescheduled for 14th January. On this, the ED is considering requesting the Supreme Court to transfer the case to the Delhi High Court for a more conducive environment for adjudication. This would also be an insult to the state of West Bengal, who is the primary respondent in the ED’s petition, during an upcoming election.

The Article 32 petition again alleges interference and obstruction in an official investigation and seeks direction on how the investigation should proceed without such obstruction and the restoration of evidence. An Article 32 petition is often made where there is an imminent threat to fundamental rights, in this case, the right of an unobstructed investigation. The ED seeks to have the matter heard before the Supreme Court on 12th January.

But the pertinent question here is, can the ED file a writ petition under Article 32 at all? A writ under this Article is normally filed by a person whose fundamental rights are threatened by the state. Does the ED, being an agency under the central government, have fundamental rights? This question was asked by Justice Oka of the Supreme Courtto the ED in April 2025 in a separate writ petition under Article 32. In that case, the ASG withdrew the petition and followed other legal recourses. So now that Justice Oka has retired, is the ED trying its luck again or is toying with another legal strategy by parallel proceedings before the High Court and the Supreme Court with similar petitions?

Curiously, no public discourse has yet addressed whether sanction would be required before any criminal process against ED officers, assuming acts were done in official discharge and protected under section 218 of the BNSS [197 of the CrPC].

4.      Can ED raids happen for long forlorn cases?

 The present case emanates from the ED ECIR no. ECIR/17/HIU/2020 dt. 28.11.2020 which in-turn comes from the CBI complaint no. RC0102020A0022 27.11.2020. Since then, the ED has made arrests and attachments as a part of its investigations, conducted by both the CBI and the ED.

There is nothing on record that shows that the ED had any fresh cause of action for conducting raids. However, it is the nature of investigation that they need to be unpredictable to be effective. The ED has alleged that I-PAC has been involved in hawala transfers from illegal coal mining which has been used for campaign expenses.

Legally, under the “continuing offence” doctrine, the ED has the right to initiate PMLA investigations that may have occurred anytime in the past, even before the PMLA was enacted. This has been widely discussed in the case of Nawab Malik. The ED had alleged that the money laundering in Malik’s case had happened in 1999, due to which he was arrested in 2022. The case is presently stayed by the Bombay High Court.

5.      What about the CCTV footage?

CCTV footage has been collected by the Kolkata police and Bidhannagar police from Pratik Jain’s residence and I-PAC’s office respectively. The ED has insisted in court to freeze the CCTV footage, showing its importance for both sides of the investigations. As of the date of the article, the footage has already been forwarded to forensic labs to find the identity of the ED officials in support of the local police investigation.

It is unclear why identification of individual ED officers is required at all, when the raid is admitted and official, unless the intent is to pursue personal criminal liability rather than institutional accountability.

This also reveals the difference in the approach of the state and the ED. The state is pursuing FIRs and police investigations, i.e. asserting territorial criminal jurisdiction. On the other hand, the ED is filing writs to assert legal supremacy and federal rights.

6.      Why is Mamata Banerjee blaming Amit Shah?

The Enforcement Directorate reports to the Ministry of Finance. The political head of that ministry is Nirmala Sitharaman, who works under the Prime Minister – Narendra Modi. However, the West Bengal Chief Minister and other TMC leaders chose to repeatedly name Amit Shah as the perpetrator of the ED action. Incidentally, Amit Shah has been visiting Bengal to organize campaign efforts for the upcoming assembly elections. So the West Bengal Chief Minister has chosen to attack a target closer to home and keep the fight regional – on a turf where she has greater command. Of course if Amit Shah is accused, Modi cannot be entirely uninvolved. But the Chief Minister has avoided naming Modi and instead chosen a target that is more likely to stick to the blame and lacks public appeal. This also allows Mamata Banerjee to keep options open for future parliamentary cooperation with the BJP. And of course, by not attacking Modi she has avoided being named an anti-national. This would be useful in future national elections.

21 December, 2025

PMLA - Bihar Sand Mining

Patna, August 22, 2025. In a significant development in a high-profile Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) case linked to alleged illegal sand-mining operations in Bihar, the Patna High Court today granted bail to Kanhaiya Prasad. The bench underscored the absence of conclusive evidence against the petitioner and raised concerns about prolonged detention without the commencement of trial proceedings.

Kanhaiya Prasad was first arrested by the Enforcement Directorate (ED) in September 2023. In May 2024, the Patna High Court granted him bail, citing constitutional principles such as the right to speedy trial.

The ruling was short-lived. On February 12, 2025, a Supreme Court bench comprising Justices Bela M. Trivedi and Prasanna B. Varale vacated the High Court’s bail order, holding that the High Court had failed to adequately apply the rigorous twin-condition test under Section 45 of the PMLA, which mandates satisfying both innocence and non-flight risk before bail can be granted.

Just days later, on February 17, 2025, the Supreme Court bench hearing Udhaw Singh v. ED applied liberal bail principles, drawing upon precedents such as V. Senthil Balaji and K.A. Najeeb, which emphasize that prolonged incarceration without trial. The Bench also noted that the February 12 order had not considered the precedents in the case of Kanhaiya Prasad.

The latest bail order, issued on August 22, 2025, reflects the High Court fully incorporating those precedents. The court meticulously addressed the Supreme Court’s findings and observations from V. Senthil Balaji and K.A. Najeeb, which were cited before the coordinate bench at the ED's request.

The bench noted that the case against Prasad hinges mainly on "conjectures and surmises." There is no documentary proof tying him to proceeds of crime or showing any nexus between him, his father, and the mining business. The prosecution’s claims regarding a so-called “syndicate” rely exclusively on uncorroborated Section 50 statements of co-accused, deemed insufficient for establishing culpability.

Having already spent nearly 15 months in custody, with no trial commenced or charges framed, the court held that the ongoing detention undermines Prasad’s fundamental right to a speedy trial – a principle repeatedly upheld in Supreme Court rulings.

In a related judgment from May 2025, the High Court quashed most of the predicate FIRs filed against sand-mining companies, reasoning that these entities could not have carried out theft as they weren’t in possession of mining ghats at the material time. The High Court further hinted at administrative laxity, noting that the mining department itself may bear responsibility for any theft. That ruling critically undermines the foundation of the ED’s laundering case.

Consequently, bail was granted with a bond of ₹ 10 lakh and standard conditions including surrender of passport, travel restrictions, and other supervisory measures.

The ED's case encompasses 12 individuals. Presently, nine are on bail, and in one instance, the Patna High Court found the ED’s arrest as illegal. Several of the predicate FIRs critical to the money-laundering charge have now been quashed, making it increasingly difficult to prosecute effectively. Though two accused remain in custody pending bail hearings, this wave of court orders signals growing judicial skepticism of the prosecution’s strategy.

This ruling illustrates a broader judicial pushback against the perceived overreach of PMLA provisions, particularly the draconian dictates of Section 45. While the PMLA was enacted to curb economic crimes, its stringent bail thresholds have often resulted in prolonged incarceration without trial – a scenario decried as "process as punishment" by critics.

Decisions in V. Senthil Balaji, K.A. Najeeb, and Manish Sisodia have carved out exceptions – granting bail when the procedural delay is unjustifiable and the case’s material weakness is evident. The latest bail order reinforces that constitutional protections under Article 21 must temper statutory draconianness, especially when trial pendency extends indefinitely.

The Patna High Court’s August 22 bail order for Kanhaiya Prasad marks not just a personal reprieve but a significant pivot in PMLA jurisprudence. It underscores that even in serious economic offences, courts must balance statutory tough-on-crime mandates with constitutional liberties. The decision – and the corresponding relief extended to other accused – may well compel the ED to rethink its prosecutorial approach in long-drawn money-laundering cases, especially when evidence is tenuous and procedural timelines indefinite.

07 December, 2025

Arrest and Bail

The recent advent of the Special Intensive Review (SIR) by the Election Commission of India has opened a new question for consideration: can an imprisoned person be allowed to vote?

Under Article 326 of the Constitution of India, every adult citizen of India who is not disqualified on the ground of non-residence, unsoundness of mind, crime or corrupt or illegal practice, shall be entitled to be registered as a voter at any election.

The Constitution does not bar an imprisoned person from voting. However, the Constitution does mention that crime, corruption, and illegality shall disqualify a person’s right to vote. In effect, the Constitution assumes that imprisonment can only come from crime, corruption, and illegality, allegations that are proven in a court of law and then sentenced from imprisonment. As we shall soon see, the assumption does not hold in India.

But before going there, let us have a look at the much quoted section 62(5) of the Representation of People Act, 1951 (RPA). The RPA states that no person shall vote at any election if he is confined in a prison under a sentence of imprisonment, or is in the lawful custody of the police; provided that this shall not apply to a person subjected to preventive detention.

Section 62(5) of the RPA rests on an outdated assumption that all imprisonment without conviction must be preventive detention. Ordinarily, a person imprisoned should be “under a sentence”. The unstated assumption of the law is that imprisonment is ordinarily levied on a convict. This assumption fails woefully in India.

As per the 2023 report of the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) under the Ministry of Home Affairs, 74% of the Indian prison population is undertrial, i.e. prisoners who have not been convicted but are awaiting trial or bail. This is nearly 4 lakh citizens. These are not convicts. They are citizens whom the State has failed to prove guilty; yet continues to imprison. The overall conviction rate is 54%. This means that nearly 2 lakh citizens are imprisoned at present who will eventually be acquitted. India imprisons citizens not for what they have done, but for what they might do. The Supreme Court judges have repeatedly called for reforms in imprisonment and bail provisions of the law in view of this gross injustice.

The Government has not been a silent spectator. But Governmental action should not be mistaken for reform; it is simply noise. In 2024, in an attempt to remove the British colonial hangover, India saw a major shift in its criminal laws.  The Indian Penal Code (IPC) was replaced by the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) and the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) was changed to Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS). Interestingly, the CrPC 1973 was not even a colonial legislature. In what can only be termed as a typical fashion of the Government, new names were imprinted on old legislations.

Under section 187 of the BNSS (167 of CrPC), a magistrate can order for a police custody of maximum 15 days and a judicial custody of 60 / 90 days, depending on the severity of the crime. During this time, the investigating authority needs to complete the investigation and file a chargesheet before the court for the trial to take place. The accused is placed under custody for the purpose of investigation, and so that he may not tamper with the witness and / or evidence during the investigation. If the chargesheet is not filed during the 60 / 90 day period, the accused gets “default bail” u/s 187(3) of the BNSS (167(2) of the CrPC).

Once the chargesheet is filed, the case moves from the pre-trial stage to the trial stage. The investigation is complete, but the court needs to ensure the presence of the accused during trial. For this, the courts can continue to keep the accused in judicial custody u/s 346 of the BNSS (309 of the CrPC).

Section 346 of the BNSS allows the court to remand the accused for a period not exceeding 15 days at a time until the trial is over. This 15-day period is repeated each time the court issues a remand order. In practice, the accused remains imprisoned for months or years while being remanded “every 15 days”. The court applies no mind for any fresh reasoning for extending the imprisonment of the accused by simply copy-pasting the previous order.

Remand is not conviction, but the outcome of both is imprisonment. Hence, the state does not need to convict a person to punish him. The state can simply extend remand indefinitely. Remand exists because the State assumes that liberty creates a risk of misconduct. But in practice, this assumption becomes a substitute for proving guilt. Instead of protecting society through evidence, the State protects itself through custody.

This is not a mandate by the constitution, but a risk-averse practice continued from the British colonial traditions. Under the British rule, liberty was secondary to control. Unfortunately, this tradition has continued in independent India. The police take advantage of this practice and oppose bail reflexively, treating custody as leverage on the accused.

The 15-day time-limit was set to ensure liberty, but the courts have converted it into rolling imprisonment. The burden flips to the accused – liberty must be earned, while imprisonment is presumed. The presumption of innocence survives only in theory. In custody courts, the presumption is reversed. The investigating agencies and the courts need not even find a reasonable ground to continue the imprisonment of an accused. In effect, this violates the Right to Life and Liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.

Any law student or graduate will tell you that “bail is rule and jail is exception” and “delay of justice is denial of justice” are some of the first teachings at law school. We have heard that Indians have a right to life and liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Yet, in practice, such words are only that… words. In practice, 4 lakh Indian citizens linger on waiting for bail or trials. Often the accused does not even have a family or friend prosperous enough to furnish the bail bond amount.

The biggest prison sentence in India is not awarded by conviction, it is awarded by delay. The solution is simple –

  • No “automatic” renewal of remand
  • Judges must give reasons for denying liberty of a person while the trial is pending
  • Automatic bail hearings where the investigating agency needs to justify the need for continued remand
  • Disciplinary consequences for copy-paste remand orders

But it will take a generation of judges to build new habits. Every remand order is a day of someone’s life. If courts cannot justify that day, they have no right to take it. Liberty is not a privilege granted after acquittal; it is a right that may be curtailed only after conviction. Until our courts act on this principle rather than merely reciting it, the Constitution will remain an idea, not an experience.

Changing the names of laws rather than actually changing laws renders the Indian sovereignty as a meaningless change of words, while the Indian mindset continues to remain under the colonial rule. The British once used imprisonment without trial to control a population. Independent India has no reason or excuse to inherit that legacy.

The question before India is simple: will we continue to imprison first and justify later, or will we finally build a justice system where liberty is the norm and custody requires proof?

26 October, 2025

Law, Order, and Justice

Anyone who has ever walked into an Indian courtroom knows this uneasy truth: the words law, order, and justice do not mean the same thing. They are thrown together as if interchangeable, but in practice they are strangers forced to share a bench.

If Indian courts were truly justice-giving, cases would not crawl across decades, suffocating under technicalities, adjournments, and appeals. A judge would weigh reality as it is, not as codified in procedural limbos, and deliver a verdict that feels holistic, human, and final. But such a judge, in India, would go mad! Justice is impossible in this system, so judges confine themselves to the narrower task of law – a safer, more bureaucratic, less human project.

Law is not justice. Law is not even order. Law is codified philosophy. It is aspirational, telling us what should be, without bothering to ask “how?” Law is the poetry of command, detached from the actual mess of enforcement. Its function is not to be true or practical, but to be repeatable.

Law was not designed for justice. If it were designed for justice, then the world would have found justice in fifty thousand years of human history. But injustice continues. Even the person reading these words right now has faced some kind of grave injustice in their own lives. So we can be sure that law does not serve the purpose of justice, nor was it designed to do so.

Order is a different beast. A violent riot may break the law, but even its mere existence disturbs order. A police firing on rioters may be lawful, but it still violates order. Restraint in retaliation may cause legal or illegal outcomes, but it maintains order. Courts and police ultimately serve order, because order is what keeps society tolerable. Justice has nothing to do with it.

Here lies the greatest confusion: the courts of India routinely proclaim that they are guardians of law. They do not and should not claim to be administrators of justice – even though their judges are called “Justices” and the institution itself is poetically named the Nyaypalika – literally, the dispenser of justice. But this is a fraud of language. The reality is less grand: the courts uphold law, and sometimes they help preserve order. Justice is not their concern, nor could it be. At best, justice may be an unintended by-product. English strips away the illusion – a “court” is just an arena of argument. The Hindi word promises a moral universe; the English word promises only a stage. And we continue to expect justice from institutions that were never designed to provide it.

Recent remarks by a member of the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisory Council have exposed other facets of this linguistic fraud. Calling the judiciary as the biggest hurdle in the path to a developed nation, he pointed out that inside a courtroom, judges are addressed as “My Lords” and a request is inevitably termed as a “prayer”, effectively elevating judges to a God-like status. This institutionalization of devotion to a procedural body has been a dangerous game that has been played for far too long.

The result is tragicomic. Citizens enter a courtroom seeking justice. What they receive is law – delayed, distorted, and sometimes denied. The court does not concern itself with truth, only with procedure. Reality does not matter; compliance does. The courtroom is a theatre where the illusion of justice is maintained, because the myth is more stabilizing than the truth.

Justice itself is not the natural order of the universe; it is an artificial human invention. The lion does not apologize to the deer. The predator does not negotiate with the prey. Nature knows no justice. Only humans invented it, and having invented it, we fail to uphold it. Why persist in the lie? Better to accept the world as it is – Random. Brutal. Unfair.

What courts actually provide is not justice but a controlled illusion of justice – a spectacle of procedures, robes, and rituals that convinces society the game is fair. Without this illusion, order might collapse. Perhaps that is why we cling to the fraud of language; why the Nyaypalika must continue to pretend it dispenses justice, while in truth it only recites law.

The Assault: The Government has taken notice, and is not sitting quietly. The 130th Constitutional Amendment proposed the removal of a Prime Minister or Chief Minister after 30 days of arrest without a trial. This signals a brutal truth – the country no longer needs courts to stand in its way. Due-process is expendable. Trial is optional. Accusation is conviction. Even though the government lacks the numbers to pass such a bill in the parliament, it has sparked a debate: is the judiciary dispensable?

In the same vein, recent amendments to the Code of Criminal Procedure and the Prevention of Money Laundering Act allow for restitution of personal property without conviction, i.e. the government can sell-off an accused’s property without while the trial is still pending. The court’s verdict is no longer the final instrument.

The President of India has in a recent public statement called for exams for appointment of judges rather than the conventional way of collegium recommendations, similar to how bureaucrats are selected. She has overlooked the fact that in this country, the bureaucracy is notoriously infamous for being the first line of corruption. In another speech, the retired Chief Justice Ramana has noted that the faith of the public in the judiciary is eroding.

The Government seems to be creating space for a debate on whether the judiciary is really a necessity for the county, or must such a flawed judiciary be dispensed with altogether? Right now, the only argument in favor of the judiciary seems to be “what is the alternative?” Ironically, this is the same argument used to support a self-proclaimed non-biological divine minister by the same government in absence of a legitimate opposition. This government has also been notorious for delegitimizing institutions such as investigating agencies and the election commission. The judiciary may be the last thorn in its path.

The Proposal: Let us be honest. Let us abandon delusion. Let the courts no longer be called Nyaypalikas. They are Kaanoonpalikas – keepers of law. Let the judges shed their presumptuous title of “Justice.” They are Law Aspirants. This would at least cure us of the false hope that walking into a courtroom means walking into justice.

If we could dare to rename our courts, our judges, and our expectations, perhaps we could finally stop confusing law with justice, order with fairness, and illusions with truth. Until then, the great deception continues – theatrics of justice without justice, performed daily in the name of law.

Honesty is more revolutionary than ritual. Let’s stop calling it justice when it is merely law. Let the raw power run naked. Strip away the illusion, confront the chaos, and create meaning without the crutches of myth.